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Abstract
We analyze the link between industry size and R&D spending distribution. We consider a
monopolistically competitive market in which firms can invest in cost-cutting R&D by paying a
fixed cost first. For an intermediate level of fixed cost, there is a unique equilibrium in which the
market segments into investing and non-investing firms. Using this equilibrium, we study how
the distribution and level of R&D expenditure changes as industry size increases. In particular,
we show that, as the market size increases, R&D spending can become more concentrated. Data
motivating these results are drawn from the Taiwanese and Korean semiconductor industries.
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1 Introduction
This paper addresses the link between changes in industry size, as measured by the number of
active firms, and the distribution of R&D investment in the market. We analyze a model in which
a continuum of firms simultaneously invest in cost-cutting R&D and then compete in the product
market. When investing in R&D involves a positive fixed cost K (e.g. establishment of an R&D
department, investment in R&D capital, etc.), for an intermediate interval of values of K there
is a unique equilibrium in which the market segments into two sets of firms. The firms in the
first set pay the fixed cost K and invest in cost-cutting R&D. As a result, they are able to charge
lower prices in the product market (because they have lower costs) and have higher product-market
profits. The firms in the second set do not invest in R&D and have a higher price level and lower
profits in the product-market. The relative measures of the two sets are determined in equilibrium
by the fact that all firms must be ex-ante indiﬀerent between being in the first or in the second set.
In Section 4, we use this equilibrium to analyze the comparative statics of a change in industry
size on the distribution of R&D spending on the market. The distribution of R&D spending in this
model is described by two variables: (i) the measure of investing firms and (ii) their level of R&D
spending. Both these variables aﬀect market price levels and consumer welfare.
We find that if the industry size increases, the measure of firms investing in R&D always
decreases in equilibrium. The intuition behind this result is as follows: for a given industry size,
suppose that we are in the asymmetric equilibrium as described earlier. If the industry size increases
- that is, more firms join the market - and the set of investing firms remains the same, the profits of
both types of firms decrease. However, the negative impact is greater for the investing firms than
for the non-investing ones. Thus, to restore the equilibrium indiﬀerence condition between the two
types of firms, we need to decrease the set of firms investing in R&D.
This implies that as industry size increases, fewer firms invest in R&D. As the firms investing in
R&D charge lower prices and sell more product than the others, the decrease in the measure of firms
investing in R&D results in fewer market leaders, which amounts in more market concentration.
Second, we examine the level of R&D spending of the investing firms. We show that two diﬀerent
eﬀects influence the level of R&D spending. First, the increase in industry size tends to decrease the
returns of R&D investment and, thus, to decrease R&D investment. We name this the “industry
size eﬀect.” Second, the decrease in the measure of investing firms could lead to lower market
competition, higher R&D investment returns and, thus, a higher investment level. This eﬀect is
novel in the literature and is named the “concentration eﬀect.” The overall eﬀect on investment
depends on the interplay between these two eﬀects, and we provide suﬃcient conditions under
which the R&D level of spending of the investing firms increases in equilibrium. This, together
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with the decrease of investing firms, amounts to a more concentrated R&D spending distribution
upon industry entry.
In Section 5 we derive a number of empirical implications from our results. In Section 6 we
discuss the eﬀects of industry entry on market eﬃciency and in particular on consumer welfare.
1.1 Empirical Motivation
The model explored in this paper is motivated by the striking distributional patterns in R&D ex-
penditure observed in some data from industries experiencing significant expansions. Table 1 shows
plant level data on the Taiwanese Semiconductor Industry (SIC 3211) drawn from manufacturing
surveys conducted by the Ministry of Economic Aﬀairs.1 During the 1980s the Taiwanese semicon-
ductor industry grew 648% (in terms of revenue) and 144% (in terms of establishments). As such,
it is a neat example of an industry undergoing significant size changes.
Panel 1 of Table 1 shows, for each survey year, the sum of (nominal) revenue attributed to
each plant, the total number of plants, the number and proportion of plants that recorded some
expenditure on R&D, and the average (across all plants) and total (nominal) expenditures on R&D.
The period between 1981 and 1986 is particularly interesting. The number of plants increased from
1279 to 2808 during this period. However, despite this rapid industrial expansion, the proportion
of plants engaged in R&D steadily decreased from 26.5% to 18.4%.
Panels 2 and 3 of Table 1 show the percentiles of expenditures on R&D. Panel 2 shows the
level of expenditure corresponding to each percentile of expenditure, so that in 1981 95% of plants
had R&D expenditure equal to or less than 14,729. Panel 3 examines the proportion of total R&D
expenditures conducted by plants at or below each percentile level, so that in 1981 firms with R&D
expenditure equal to or less than 14,729 (i.e. corresponding to those firms at or below the 95th
percentile) accounted for 18.4% of total R&D expenditure. Read together Panels 2 and 3 show
a striking shift in the distribution of R&D expenditure, with R&D expenditure becoming more
concentrated during the period of dramatic industry expansion occurring between 1981 and 1986.
That is to say, those establishments in the far right tail of the distribution of R&D expenditures
increase their R&D intensity markedly, which other establishments decrease their expenditures. It
is notable that these trends become reversed in the years after 1986.2
1The data in these surveys cover between 88% and 94% of employment in the manufacturing sector (depending
on the survey year). We are greatful to Daniel Xu for his help in accessing these data. The data is avaliable at
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~jasker/
2During the early- to mid-80s the Taiwanese semiconductor industry was expanding in areas such as chip design,
testign, packaging and some specialist fabrication. Significantly, the large DRAM (memory chip) market during this
period was dominated by Japan and the US, with Taiwan not being a participant. A significant structural break
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Similar patterns in R&D expenditure emerge in other data. Table 2 shows an abbreviated
version of Table 1, reporting plant level data on the Korean semiconductor industry drawn from
manufacturing surveys conducted by the Korean Government (see Xu 2008 for a description of
these surveys). The same patterns seen in the Taiwanese data emerge in the Korean data during
the period 1993-1996 which also corresponds to a period of dramatic industry expansion. The
emergence of similar patterns in the Korean and Taiwanese data is all the more noteworthy due
to the diﬀerences in government policy toward the semiconductor industry in each industry and
the much higher concentration of the Korean semiconductor industry relative to the Taiwanese
industry (see Matthews and Cho (2000) for a comparative history).
The model developed in this paper seeks to provide a market based explanation for these
contemporaneous industry expansions and shifts in R&D expenditures. First, it captures the fact
that while some establishments do engage in R&D, many do not. Second, it develops an intuition
for why the distribution of R&D expenditures may change with industry size. Third, it explains
why the maximum level of R&D expenditure in the industry increases (a topic of interest in earlier
literature (e.g. Sutton (2001)). Lastly, it suggests some intuition behind the drop in the proportion
of establishments engaged in R&D.3
It is worth stating explicitly that the model is intentionally stylized and does not purport to
explain the Taiwanese and Korean experiences specifically or completely. The purpose of the model
is to carefully develop a set of intuitions for how changes in industry size aﬀects the distribution
of R&D. The contribution of the model is to provide a set of comparative statics linking industry
size and R&D patterns that provide a framework for applied researchers to balance the incentives
provided by (say) R&D, or trade policies against the incentives provided by the market. It is
designed to be broadly applicable to a large class of industrial settings. That said, the model is
constructed with the patterns evident in the data firmly in mind.
The Taiwanese and Korean case studies, from which empirical motivation is drawn, contribute
to several modelling decisions. First, the model focuses on cost cutting innovations rather than
demand shifting innovations. Fitting any innovation into this taxonomy is always problematic, but
necessary for parsimony. Since the Taiwanese and Korean semiconductor industries were never
defining the frontier of technological accomplishment during the two periods of industry expansion,
we have chosen to examine cost-cutting innovation. Second, we focus on exogenous changes in
industry size as measured by firm numbers. An alternative may have been to model demand shifts
occured in the industry in 1986 with the developement of large scale foundry facilities by TSMC, heralding the
begining of Taiwan’s entry into the DRAM fabrication (see Matthews and Cho (2000)).
3To capture the drop in the proportion but the (weak) increase in the number of firms doing R&D requires a
minor extension of the basic model. As an example, a demand shift along with industry expansion can do this.
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with a model of firm entry. However, since we wanted to be agnostic as to whether entry was a
function demand shocks, government policy, globalization, or some other shock, we chose not to
make the entry process endogenous.4 Third, the data examined here is at the plant level and while
the theory is at the firm level. This is of particular relevance to the Korean data, since the Korean
industry is highly concentrated. Sadly, data on ownership structures are unavailable. Our concern
about this aspect of the data lead us to examine both the Korean and Taiwanese data, hoping that
seeing similar patterns across industries with very diﬀerent structures would mitigate measurement
problems arising from this data constraint. Similarly, the data is more aggregated than we would
like, covering firms at several levels in the industry’s vertical chain.5 Lastly, we consider a model
in which firms produce diﬀerentiated products. Servati and Simon (2005) describe the various
dimensions on which products in the semiconductor industry are diﬀerentiated.
1.2 Existing Literature
Market structure was first identified by Shumpeter as one of the key determinants of R&D spending,
the connection between industry size and R&D spending. This observation has generated a vast
literature. In particular, Loury (1979), Lee and Wide (1980) and Reinganum (1982, 1985) first
studied the impact of entry on R&D in the contest of patent races.
More recently, Sutton (2001) tackled the problem of linking industry concentration and R&D
intensity. In his analysis, firms have the possibility to invest in several R&D trajectories. The scope
economies across these trajectories and the eﬀectiveness of R&D technology together determine a
measure of how much a firm that outspends its rival in R&D can steal consumers away from other
firms. This measure sets a lower bound to both the equilibrium market concentration and R&D
intensity of the highest spender in the market. This approach is diﬀerent from ours as our focus is
on the entire R&D market distribution. In other words, besides studying the determinants of the
highest R&D level on the market, we are also interested in studying the proportion of firms on the
market that decide to spend in R&D at all, as a second key determinant of market eﬃciency.
An alternative modelling approach to that taken in this paper may have been to adopt the fully
dynamic framework of Ericson and Pakes (1995) and Pakes and McGuire(1994). Setting aside the
expositional advantages of an analytic model, the asymmetric equilibrium that is explored in this
4Clearly, some shocks, like a demand shock, may aﬀect other parameters beyond just the number of entering firms.
A demand shock will shift the demand curve as well as attract entry. Our analysis isolates the entry eﬀect as the
comparative static that generates novel eﬀect. The model is easily extended to accomodate a simultaneous demand
shift (for instance).
5These considerations limit the extent to which the model can be meaningfully tested using these data. Testing -
while possibly feasible using these, or similar, data - would require a data collection exercise beyond the scope of the
current paper.
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paper does not easily translate to the Markov-Perfect equilibrium concept exploited in the Pakes-
and McGuire-style dynamic frameworks.
Empirical findings related to our results are in Dieter (1997). This paper is an empirical
analysis on how globalization (seen as industry entry at several levels of production) leads to
more concentration in the hard disk drive industry. These results are consistent with our results.
2 The Model
2.1 Firms and consumers
Consider a monopolistic competitive market populated by a fixed interval of firms N = [0, n]. The
preferences of the representative consumer are described by a Dixit-Stiglitz utility function6
u (y) = m+W ln
∙Z n
0
y (i)α di
¸1/α
where y (i) is the consumption of the good produced by firm i ∈ N , m is the numeraire,
W > 0 and α ∈ (0, 1). As is well known, utility maximization subject to the budget constraint
m+
R n
0 p(i)y (i) di ≤ E, yields to the demand function for good i given its price p(i) is
y (i) =Mp (i)−
1
1−α
with M ≡ WU n
0 p(j)
− α1−α dj
.
After having paid a fixed cost K > 0, each firm i ∈ N can invest an amount k(i) ∈ R+
in developing cost-cutting technology. Such investment has the eﬀect of reducing the (constant)
marginal cost of production of the firm according to the function c : R+ → (0, 1] defined as
c(k) = (1 + k)−ρ with ρ ∈ (0, 1).7
To guarantee that the optimal investment problem has an interior solution and to focus the
analysis on the most interesting cases, we assume that the parameters of the model satisfy the
following requirements:
Assumption 1 α and ρ satisfy α+ αρ− 1 < 0.
6See Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
7Note that we do not require all the firms to develop the same technology, but we assume that two technologies
developed with the same investment k cut the costs to the same level c(k). Also, we focus on a particular functional
form for c(·) for the sake of simplicity. None of the results of the paper crucially depends on the specific characteristics
of this functional form.
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2.2 Timing
The timing of the game is as follows:
(1) All firms i ∈ N simultaneously decide whether and how much to invest in R&D by paying
K + k(i) ∈ R+. If a firm decides not to invest in R&D, that firm pays zero.
(2) Each firm i ∈ N adopts the technology c(i) = (1+k(i))−ρ and decides how much to produce
by choosing q (i) ∈ R+.
(3) The production is sold on the market and profits are realized.
In this paper, we adopt Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) as the solution concept,
and focus on pure strategy SPNE.
2.2.1 Payoﬀs
The payoﬀ of a generic firm i ∈ N in the monopolistic competitive market is:
eπ(i) = [p(i)− c (i)] y (i)− k(i)−K1{k(i)>0}
where [p(i)− c (i)] y (i) is the product-market profit, k(i) is the investment in R&D, and K is
the fixed cost paid for R&D.8 After solving for equilibrium in the final product market, because
the firms’ optimal mark-up rule in this model is p(i) = c(i)α , it is easy to check that
eπ(i) = W (1− α)R
N c(j)
−α
1−αdj
c(i)−
α
1−α − k(i)−K1{k(i)>0} (1)
It is easy to see that the payoﬀ of firm i is decreasing in the technology level of its competitors.
This is because the technology level of the other firms aﬀects the other firms’ prices and, via
monopolistic competition, the demand that firm i faces on the final product market.9
3 Equilibrium Analysis
Observe that, given that one firm decides to pay the fixed cost K and invest in R&D, the optimal
investment level of firm i is given by the solution of the problem
max
k(i)∈R+
A(1 + k(i))
αρ
1−α − k(i) (2)
8We denote by 1E the indicator variable equal to 1 if the event E occurs and zero otherwise.
9 In what follows, when describing the profit of a firm, we will use the notation A ≡ W (1−α)U
N c(j)
−α
1−α dj
.
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where A ≡ W (1−α)U
N (1+k(j))
αρ
1−α dj
is a function of the other firms’ investment levels. By Assumption
1, such a problem has a unique solution, k∗(i) =
³
Aαρ
1−α
´− 1−α
1−α−αρ − 1.
3.1 Symmetric Equilibria
Let us focus first on the symmetric equilibria of the model. If all firms invest, it is easy to see
that the investment in equilibrium is k∗ = Wαρn − 1. If
Wαρ
n ≤ 1, no firm invests in a symmetric
equilibrium. We now focus on the case in which such investment is positive (Wαρn > 1), and, in the
next result, we characterize the conditions under which all firms invest in R&D in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 There exists a K > 0 such that there is a equilibrium in which all firms invest in
R&D if and only if Wαρn > 1 and K < K. Under these conditions, such equilibrium is also unique.
The next results provides necessary and suﬃcient conditions for an equilibrium in which no firm
invests in R&D to exist.
Proposition 2 There exists K > 0 such that there is a equilibrium in which no firms invest in
R&D if and only if either Wαρn < 1 or K > K. Under is condition, this equilibrium is also unique.
Since it is easy to show that K > K, there is no symmetric equilibrium if K ∈
¡
K,K
¢
.
3.2 Asymmetric Equilibrium
To complete the equilibrium analysis, let us look at the asymmetric equilibria of our model. In
particular, in the next result, we characterize necessary and suﬃcient conditions for an asymmetric
equilibrium to exist. We also show that, under the same conditions, this equilibrium is unique.
Proposition 3 If Wαρn > 1 and K ∈
¡
K,K
¢
there exists a unique equilibrium. In such equilirium,
only a positive measure µ∗ ∈ (0, n) of firms invest in R&D. If either Wαρn ≤ 1 or K /∈
¡
K,K
¢
, no
asymmetric equilibria exist.
The equilibrium described in Proposition 3 is built as follows. Let µ be the measure of firms
making a positive investment in R&D. Observe that, since all investing firms face the same problem
(2), their R&D investment has to be the same. For any µ, let this investment level be k(µ). Let
us now denote by πI(µ) the equilibrium profits of a firm investing in R&D when a measure µ of
firms are investing k(µ) in R&D. Similarly, denote by πNI(µ) the equilibrium profits of a firm not
investing in R&D when a measure µ of firms are investing k(µ) in R&D. In equilibrium, µ should
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guarantee that the payoﬀ of an investing firms is equal to the payoﬀ of the non-investing firms -
that is, the equilibrium µ∗ must satisfy
πI(µ
∗) = πNI(µ
∗) (3)
In order to guarantee that such µ∗ exists in the range (0, n) , let us analyze the extremes of
this interval. Suppose that µ = 0, and observe that Proposition 2 implies that, if K < K, then
πI(0) > πNI(0). On the other hand, suppose that µ = n. Because of Proposition 1, we have that if
K > K, then πI(n) < πNI(n). Thus, if K ∈
¡
K,K
¢
, the functions πI(µ) and πNI(µ) have to cross
at least one µ∗ in the interval (0, n).10 The uniqueness part of the proof follows from the fact that,
under our assumptions, the function πI(µ) decreases faster than πNI(µ) at any µ. This implies that
the two functions can cross at most once.
The result above describes the suﬃcient and necessary conditions for the existence of an asym-
metric equilibrium in which a measure µ∗ > 0 of firms invest k(µ∗) in R&D, achieve a better
technology, charge lower prices and collect higher profits on the product-market. On the other
hand, a measure n− µ > 0 of firms do not invest in R&D, save in R&D fixed costs, charge higher
prices and realize lower profits on the product-market.
4 Industry Size and the Distribution of R&D
In this section, we study the impact of a change in the size of the market (that is, n) on the
equilibria structure of the model. In particular, we are interested in looking at the distribution of
R&D investment across firms after an increase in n. The R&D distribution is captured by the two
endogenous variables µ, the measure of firms investing in R&D, and k, the per-firm investment.
4.1 Industry Size and Concentration of R&D Investing
Note first that, by Proposition 2, when n > Wαρ, the only equilibrium is a symmetric one in which
no firm invests. Thus, letting n grow arbitrarily large, eventually causes firms to stop investing in
R&D. Suppose now that n increases in the range [0,Wαρ] The implications of an increase in the
industry size n is described in the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 As n increases in the interval [0,Wαρ], the equilibrium measure of investing firms
µ∗ decreases.
10We refer to the Appendix for the necessity of the conditions in Proposition 3 for the existence of an asymmetric
equilibrium.
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The intuition behind Proposition 4 is the following. For a given industry size n, suppose that we
are in an asymmetric equilibrium as described in Proposition 3, and µ∗ is the equilibrium measure
of investing firms. Let us now increase the industry size n and look at the profits of investing and
not-investing firms if the measure of investing firms is still µ∗. While the profits of both types
of firms decrease, the negative impact is greater for the investing firms than for the non-investing
ones. Thus, the equilibrium indiﬀerence condition between the two types of firms must be satisfied
at a µ < µ∗.
The next results summarize how the equilibrium measure of investing firms changes as n varies.
Corollary 5 There are n and n such that if n < n all firms invest in R&D, if n ∈ [n, n], then the
measure of investing firms µ decreases as n increases, and if n > n, then no firm invests.
4.2 Industry Size and Level of R&D Investing
Let us now focus on the second variable that determines the R&D spending distribution in the
industry- that is, the investment level of the investing firms k. The equilibrium investment level k
is the maximum technology level reached in this economy, and, in equilibrium, it is aﬀected by a
change in the industry size n.
The impact of a change in n on the equilibrium investment k(n) is influenced by two separate
eﬀects. The first one, that we name“industry size eﬀect,” measures how the increase in industry size,
keeping the measure of investing firms constant, aﬀects the investment level of the firms investing
in R&D. Since an increase in industry size, via an increase in the level of market competition,
decreases the returns of the R&D investment, it is always the case that the industry size eﬀect
aﬀects the R&D spending level negatively. The second eﬀect, that we name the “concentration
eﬀect,” is novel and measures how the increase in industry size aﬀects the R&D investment level
via the decrease in the measure of investing firms. Since a decrease of investing firms increases in
R&D investment returns, the concentration eﬀect aﬀects the R&D spending level positively.
This discussion implies that the net eﬀect of increase in industry size on R&D spending level
depends on the relative size of two eﬀects. Let µ(n) be the function that maps the industry size n
into the equilibrium measure of investing firms µ. We can state now the following result.
Proposition 6 If
¯¯¯
∂µ(n)
∂n
h
(1 + k)
αρ
1−α − 1
i¯¯¯
> 1, the concentration eﬀect dominates the market eﬀect
and the level of R&D spending increases if n increases. If
¯¯¯
∂µ(n)
∂n
h
(1 + k)
αρ
1−α − 1
i¯¯¯
< 1, the market
eﬀect dominates the concentration eﬀect and the level of R&D spending decreases if n increases.
Proposition 6 implies that
¯¯¯
∂µ(n)
∂n
h
(1 + k)
αρ
1−α − 1
i¯¯¯
> 1 is a suﬃcient condition for an increase
in n to cause a more concentrated R&D resulting distribution-that is, a distribution with smaller
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support and higher spending level.
5 Empirical Implications
Propositions 3 and 4, and Corollaries 5 and 6 allow us to derive the empirical implications of the
model.
First, let us describe the implications of Proposition 3.
Implication 1: In markets in which cost-cutting R&D involves a fixed cost, the market seg-
ments into two sets of firms. The firms in the first set invest in R&D, charge lower prices, sell
more products and have higher product-market profits. The firms in the second set do not invest in
R&D, charge higher prices, sell less product and have lower product-market profits.
Implication 1 is reflected in the motivating empirical example from the Taiwanese semiconductor
industry. On average, only around 25% of establishments are active in R&D in any year.
Second, let us turn to the impact of an increase in industry size on the measure of firms investing
in R&D analyzed in Proposition 4 and Corollary 5. Because of Proposition 4,
¯¯¯
∂µ(n)
∂n
¯¯¯
increases in
(1 + k)
αρ
1−α . This implies the following:
Implication 2: As the industry size increases, the set of firms investing in R&D on the market
reduces. In addition:
(a) This reduction is larger the higher the degree of substitution among the products (α).
(b) This reduction is larger the better the R&D cost-cutting technology ( ρ).
Implication 2 implies that, if data existed that allowed a comparison of the Korean and Tai-
wanese semiconductor industries on the basis of product and technology mix, we would expect to
see (after appropriate econometric conditioning) that the industry with better technologies and
closer substitutes experiencing a greater drop in the number of R&D active establishments during
their expansionary periods.
Finally, let us turn to the empirical implications of Proposition 6. Both a higher degree of
substitution among products (higher α) and a better R&D cost-cutting technology (higher ρ)
increase the concentration eﬀect. Thus, we can derive the following:
Implication 3: As entry occurs in a market characterized by a high (low) degree of substitution
among products- that is, higher (lower) α- the best technology level reached in the market increases
(decreases).
Implication 4: As entry occurs in a market characterized by more (less) eﬃcient R&D cost-
cutting technology- that is, higher (lower) ρ- the best technology level reached in the market increases
(decreases).
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Implications 3 and 4 suggest that, (again) if data existed that allowed a comparison of the
Korean and Taiwanese semiconductor industries on the basis of product and technology mix, we
would expect to see (after appropriate econometric conditioning) that the industry with better
technologies and closer substitutes should experience a greater increase in R&D spending during
their expansionary periods.
The intuition behind Implications 3 and 4 is the following. Because of Proposition 4,
¯¯¯
∂µ(n)
∂n
¯¯¯
increases in (1 + k)
αρ
1−α . This implies that the condition
¯¯¯
∂µ(n)
∂n
¯¯¯ h
(1 + k)
αρ
1−α − 1
i
> 1 (which is
necessary and suﬃcient for the concentration eﬀect to dominate the market eﬀect) is more likely
to be satisfied as αρ1−α increases. Note that both a higher α and a higher ρ increase the ratio
αρ
1−α , and, thus, they can increase the chances of
∂k(n)
∂n > 0 to be satisfied. Let us recall that a
higher α represents a higher degree of substitution among the products in the market. Thus, a high
degree of substitution (hence, a higher degree of competition on the original market) leads to higher
concentration after an increase in industry size and to a higher level of equilibrium investment. The
same is true for a high ρ, which represents a better R&D cost-cutting technology. Thus, in markets
that have better R&D cost-cutting technology, we should observe more market concentration after
an increase in industry size and greater equilibrium R&D investment.
6 Welfare Analysis
In the previous sections we have analyzed how a change in industry size aﬀects the R&D distribution
in an industry. There may be multiple reasons why we should be concerned about R&D distribution
from a market eﬃciency perspective. First, in an industry in which cost-cutting technologies are
similar across diﬀerentiated products, a distribution in which many firms invest could imply an
eﬃciency loss due to duplication costs. On the other hand, technology diﬀusion throughout the
market could improve the chances of new ideas arising and incremental research to develop in
the future. Third, the characteristics of the R&D distribution aﬀect, via its eﬀect on prices, the
price distribution and the consumer welfare. In what follows, we discuss the consumer welfare
implications of the results presented so far. In particular, we address the question of whether an
increase in industry size is always beneficial for consumers. We show that there are conditions
under which an increase in market size, via more concentrated R&D spending distribution, causes
the consumers to be worse oﬀ.
First of all, note that since an increase in n results in an increase in the variety of products,
there is a benefit for consumers that is not quantified in this model. Thus, here we focus on the
price eﬀects coming from the increase in industry size only. This implies that the net benefit we
address should be considered a lower bound on the total net benefit for consumers.
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Consider an increase in n. By Proposition 4, this will result in an increase in R&D concentration.
By Proposition 6, if
¯¯¯
∂µ(n)
∂n
¯¯¯ h
(1 + k)
αρ
1−α − 1
i
< 1, we have that ∂k(n)∂n < 0. This would imply that
the resulting two eﬀects, an increase in market concentration and a decrease in R&D spending, are
negative for consumers. Thus,
¯¯¯
∂µ(n)
∂n
¯¯¯ h
(1 + k)
αρ
1−α − 1
i
< 1 is a suﬃcient condition for an increase
in industry size to be negative for the consumers, and, as we already discussed in the previous
section, both a higher α and a higher ρ make this condition more likely to be satisfied.
However, if
¯¯¯
∂µ(n)
∂n
¯¯¯ h
(1 + k)
αρ
1−α − 1
i
> 1, we have that ∂k(n)∂n > 0. Then, for consumers’ point of
view, there is a tension between the increase in market concentration (which is a negative eﬀect)
and an increase in the R&D spending of the investing firms (which is a positive eﬀect). Thus, the
eﬀects on consumer welfare could be either positive or negative depending on the relative size of
these eﬀects.
7 Conclusion
The model presented in this paper is novel in that it shed light on some of the determinants of the
highest R&D level on the market and, particularly, studies the proportion of firms on the market
that decide to spend in R&D at all and the R&D intensity of these firms. As such it examines am
important sub-set of the determinants of the broader distribution of R&D activity with an industry.
The focus of the paper on how industry size aﬀects R&D is motivated by the striking changes
in R&D patterns observed in data from the Taiwanese and Korean semiconductor industries during
periods of dramatic industry expansion. The model developed to explore market based intuitions for
these sorts of changes captures several elements of the data including: the division of establishments
into those that do and do not engage in R&D (empirical implication 1); the increase in the intensity
of R&D conducted by the top percentile of firms engaged in R&D (empirical implications 3 and
4); and, gives some sense of the equilibrium forces that may have contributed to the proportion of
firms engaged in R&D decreasing (building on empirical implication 2).
While the model is much more generally applicable, this motivating example provides an em-
pirical setting that is useful to see the relevance and usefulness of the framework provided.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Let us assume that all firms invest in R&D. In this situation, the
equilibrium investment of all firms is k∗ = Wαρn − 1. Thus, if a firm invests, the profit is
W (1−α)
n −
Wαρ
n +1−K, while if it doesn’t the profit is
W (1−α)
n(Wαρn )
αρ
1−α
=
¡
W
n
¢ 1−α−αρ
1−α (1−α)(αρ)
−αρ
1−α . This implies
that all firms investing in R&D is an equilibrium if
W (1− α)
n
− Wαρ
n
+ 1−K ≥
µ
W
n
¶1−α−αρ
1−α
(1− α)(αρ)
−αρ
1−α
or
K ≤ W
n
[1− α− αρ−
µ
Wαρ
n
¶−αρ
1−α
(1− α)] + 1 ≡ K¥
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose that no firm invests in R&D. In this case, if a firm invests, the
optimal investment is k∗ =
³
Wαρ
n
´ 1−α
1−α−αρ − 1 . By Assumption 1, Wαρn > 1 guarantees k∗ to be
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positive. Thus, a firm is better oﬀ not investing if
W (1− α)
n
≥ W (1− α)
n
(1 + k∗)
αρ
1−α−αρ − k∗ −K.
This implies that if
K ≥ K ≡
µ
Wαρ
n
¶ 1−α
1−α−αρ
∙
1− α
αρ
− 1
¸
− W (1− α)
n
+ 1
there exist a unique equilibrium in which no firm invests in R&D¥
Proof of Proposition 3. First, we build an asymmetric equilibrium and we find the equilibrium
measure µ of investing firms, then, we address uniqueness. Let µ be the measure of firms making
a positive investment in R&D. Observe that, since all investing firms face the same problem (2),
their investment has to be the same. In particular, the optimal investment problem of an investing
firm i (2) has solution k∗i =
³
A(µ,k−i)αρ
1−α
´ 1−α
1−αρ−α − 1 where A(µ, k−i) = W (1−α)
µ(1+k−i)
αρ
1−α+(n−µ)
and k−i
represents the investment level of the other investing firms. As dk∗i /dk−i < 0, for anyµ, we have a
unique k∗ satisfying the equilibrium condition
k∗ =
µ
A(µ, k∗)αρ
1− α
¶ 1−α
1−αρ−α
− 1
which we denote by k∗(µ). Let us now denote by πI(µ) the equilibrium profits of a firm investing
in R&D- that is, πI(µ) =
W (1−α)(1+k∗(µ))
αρ
1−α
µ(1+k∗(µ))
αρ
1−α+(n−µ)
−K - and by πNI(µ) the equilibrium profits of a firm
non investing in R&D- that is, πNI(µ) =
W (1−α)
µ(1+k∗(µ))
αρ
1−α+(n−µ)
. In equilibrium, µ should be such
that the payoﬀ of the investing firms should be equal to the payoﬀ of the non-investing firms- that
is,
πI(µ) = πNI(µ) (4)
In order to guarantee that µ is in the range (0, n) , let us analyze the extremes of this interval.
Suppose that µ = 0, and let us check that πI(0) > πNI(0). If µ = 0, we have k∗ =
³
Wαρ
n
´ 1−α
1−α−αρ−1.
Because of Assumption 1, we have that k∗ > 0 if and only if Wαρn > 1. In this case, πI(0) > πNI(0)
if K < K. On the other hand, if a measure µ = n of firms invest, πI(n) < πNI(n) if K > K. Thus,
condition (4) has to be satisfied for at least one µ∗ ∈ (0, n). To show uniqueness of the equilibrium,
follow exactly steps (a) and (b) of Proposition 9 in Baccara (2007).
For the argument we just made on the extremes of the interval (0, n), Propositions 1 and 2
guarantee that if K /∈
¡
K,K
¢
, πI(µ) and πNI(µ) do not cross in the range (0, n) and no µ satisfies
(4).
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Finally, let us now focus on the case Wαρn < 1, and let us check if it is possible in this case to
sustain asymmetric equilibria in which a measure µ ∈ (0, n) of firms invest in equilibrium. Note
that, if µ = 0, we have k∗ =
³
Wαρ
n
´ 1−α
1−α−αρ − 1 < 0 (this is guaranteed by Assumption 1, which
implies that k∗ > 0 if and only if Wαρn > 1). Thus, since
dk(µ)
dµ < 0, the R&D level for investing
firms has to be zero for any µ. However, if this is the case, non-investing firms are always better
oﬀ than investing firms, and there is no asymmetric equilibrium. This guarantees that there are no
asymmetric equilibria if Wαρn < 1 and concludes the characterization of the asymmetric equilibria.¥
Proof of Proposition 4. Fix n ∈ (0,Wαρ) and K ∈
¡
K,K
¢
. Thus, by Proposition 3, there
exists an asymmetric equilibrium where a measure bµ of firms invests in R&D. Now, keeping bµ
constant, let ki be the solution of firm i’s problem
ki = arg max
k∈R+
W (1− α)bµ(1 + k−i) αρ1−α + (n− bµ) (1 + k)
αρ
1−α − k (5)
and denote k(n) ≡ ki = k−i the investment level of the investing firms as a function of n. Let
A(n) ≡ W (1−α)
µ(1+k(n))
αρ
1−α+(n−µ)
.
First step: First, let us show that ∂A(n)∂n < 0. We have
∂A (n)
∂n
=
−W (1− α)
h
µ αρ1−α(1 + k(n))
αρ−1+α
1−α ∂k(n)
∂n + 1
i
h
µ(1 + k(n))
αρ
1−α + (n− µ)
i2
thus, ∂A(n)∂n < 0 if and only if
µ
αρ
1− α(1 + k)
αρ−1+α
1−α
∂k (n)
∂n
+ 1 > 0 (6)
Now, let us evaluate ∂k(n)∂n . From the first order condition of 5, we have that the function k (n)
is implicitly defined by
Wαρ (1 + k)
αρ−1+α
1−α
n+ µ
h
(1 + k)
αρ
1−α − 1
i − 1 = 0
Thus, we have
∂k(n)
∂n
=
1
αρ−1+α
1−α (1 + k)
−1+α
1−α
h
n+ µ
h
(1 + k)
αρ
1−α − 1
ii
− µ αρ1−α (1 + k)
αρ−1+α
1−α
(7)
Substituting (7) into (6), we get that (6) is equivalent to
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µ αρ1−α(1 + k)
αρ−1+α
1−α
αρ−1+α
1−α (1 + k)
−1+α
1−α
h
n+ µ
h
(1 + k)
αρ
1−α − 1
ii
− µ αρ1−α (1 + k)
αρ−1+α
1−α
> −1
or
αρµ
1−α(1 + k)
αρ−1+α
1−α
−αρµ
1−α (1 + k)
−1+α
1−α + nαρ1−α (1 + k)
−1+α
1−α − (1 + k)−1
h
n+ µ
h
(1 + k)
αρ
1−α − 1
ii > −1
which is equivalent to
αρµ
1−α(1 + k)
αρ−1+α
1−α
nαρ
1−α (1 + k)
−1 − αρµ1−α (1 + k)
−1 − n(1+k) − µ (1 + k)
−1+α+αρ
1−α + µ(1+k)
> −1
Now, let D ≡ n αρ1−α (1 + k)
−1 − µ αρ1−α (1 + k)
−1 − n (1 + k)−1 − µ (1 + k)
−1+α+αρ
1−α + (1 + k)−1 µ.
If D ≥ 0, (6) is satisfied and the claim is true. Suppose, instead, that D < 0. In this case, (6)
becomes
µ αρ1−α(1 + k)
αρ−1+α
1−α < −n αρ1−α (1 + k)
−1+α
1−α + µ αρ1−α (1 + k)
−1+α
1−α +
n (1 + k)
−1+α
1−α + µ (1 + k)
−1+α+αρ
1−α − (1 + k)
−1+α
1−α µ
(8)
Since, by Assumption, αρ1−α < 1, a suﬃcient condition to guarantee (8) to be satisfied is
µ(1 + k)
αρ−1+α
1−α < −n αρ1−α (1 + k)
−1+α
1−α + µ αρ1−α (1 + k)
−1+α
1−α +
n (1 + k)
−1+α
1−α + µ (1 + k)
−1+α+αρ
1−α − (1 + k)
−1+α
1−α µ
which reduces to
0 < (n− µ) −αρ
1− α + (n− µ)
or (n− µ) 1−α−αρ1−α > 0, which is true since
1−α−αρ
1−α > 0.
Second step: To show that µ decreases as n increases, first observe that, if we start with an
equilibrium bµ measure of investing firms such that πNI ( bµ) = πI ( bµ), and we denote by k (n)
equilibrium investment level at bµ, we have that
∂πI (n)
∂n
=
∂A (n)
∂n
(1 + k (n))
αρ
1−α +
+
∙
A (1 + k (n))
αρ−1+α
1−α
αρ
1− α − 1
¸
∂k (n)
∂n
=
∂A (n)
∂n
(1 + k (n))
αρ
1−α
<
∂A (n)
∂n
=
∂πNI (n)
∂n
< 0
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where ∂A(n)∂n (1 + k (n))
αρ
1−α < ∂A(n)∂n is guaranteed by the fact that, because of the first step of
the proof, ∂A(n)∂n < 0. This implies that if n increases, πI (n) decreases faster than πNI (n) . So,
we have that, if we increase n, the new payoﬀ functions computed at bµ are such that πI ( bµ) <
πNI ( bµ) ,which implies that the intersection between the two curves occurs at a lower µ.¥
Proof of Corollary 5. Recall that if K < K = Wn (1 − α − αρ) + 1, in the unique equilibrium
all firms invest, thus, if n < WK (1 − α − αρ) + 1 ≡ n, the measure of investing firms is n. If
K > K =
³
Wαρ
n
´ 1−α
1−α−αρ
h
1−α
αρ − 1
i
− W (1−α)n + 1, no firm invests. Let us show that this implies a
threshold for n. To see this, it is suﬃcient to show that the K is monotonically decreasing in n.
However, it is easy to see that
∂K
∂n
= − 1− α
1− α− αρ
µ
Wαρ
n
¶ αρ
1−α−αρ Wαρ
n2
∙
1− α
αρ
− 1
¸
+
W (1− α)
n2
< 0
since −
³
Wαρ
n
´ αρ
1−α−αρ
+ 1 < 0 because Wαρn > 1.
Thus, there is bn such that, if n > bn, then in the unique equilibrium no firm invests. Recall that,
by Proposition 2, if n > Wαρ, nobody invests either, so let us set n = min{Wαρ, bn}. The rest of
the proof follows from Proposition 4. ¥
Proof of Proposition 6: The impact of a change in n on the equilibrium investment k(n) is
captured by ∂k(n)∂n .
11 This derivative is implicitly defined by the equilibrium condition
Wαρ (1 + k)
αρ−1+α
1−α
n+ µ
h
(1 + k)
αρ
1−α − 1
i−1 = 0
In particular, by the Implicit Function Theorem, we get
∂k(n)
∂n
=
1 + ∂µ(n)∂n
h
(1 + k)
αρ
1−α − 1
i
n
n+ µ
h
(1 + k)
αρ
1−α − 1
io
αρ−1+α
1−α (1 + k)
−1 − µ αρ1−α (1 + k)
αρ−1+α
1−α
= MS + CON
where, to separate the two eﬀects that aﬀect ∂k(n)∂n , we let
MS =
1n
n+ µ
h
(1 + k)
αρ
1−α − 1
io
αρ−1+α
1−α (1 + k)
−1 − µ αρ1−α (1 + k)
αρ−1+α
1−α
be the “industry size eﬀect.” It is easy to show that it is always the case that MS < 0. On the
other hand, let
11Note that it is not the derivative defined in (7), since, in that case, we were keeping µ constant. In this case, we
let µ move to the new equilibrium.
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CON =
∂µ(n)
∂n
h
(1 + k)
αρ
1−α − 1
i
n
n+ µ
h
(1 + k)
αρ
1−α − 1
io
αρ−1+α
1−α (1 + k)
−1 − µ αρ1−α (1 + k)
αρ−1+α
1−α
be the “concentration eﬀect.” Note that, since by Proposition 4 ∂µ(n)∂n < 0, CON > 0.
This implies that the sign of ∂k(n)∂n depends on the relative size of two eﬀects- that is,
∂µ(n)
∂n
h
(1 + k)
αρ
1−α − 1
i
≷
−1, or
¯¯¯
∂µ(n)
∂n
h
(1 + k)
αρ
1−α − 1
i¯¯¯
≷ 1¥
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Table 1: R&D in the Taiwanese Semiconductor Industry 1981-93
Panel 1: Summary Statistics
Year No. Of Plants Industry Revenue No. of R&D Active Plants Proportion doing R&D Avg R&D Exp. Total R&D Exp.
81 1279 234,795,584              339 26.5% 4,072               1,380,501            
82 1350 289,466,529              373 27.6% 5,353               1,996,663            
83 1469 366,308,102              328 22.3% 6,691               2,194,586            
84 1710 525,547,715              342 20.0% 8,437               2,885,322            
86 2808 803,053,684              517 18.4% 9,507               4,914,974            
87 3023 971,443,116              635 21.0% 11,262             7,151,391            
88 3127 1,183,736,845           722 23.1% 12,832             9,264,517            
89 3121 1,751,324,399           815 26.1% 15,436             12,580,019          
91 3184 1,736,267,113           925 29.1% 21,249             19,655,308          
92 3437 2,156,047,175           999 29.1% 22,573             22,550,042          
93 3671 2,666,828,799           1089 29.7% 25,026             27,253,825          
Panel 2: R&D Expenditure Percentiles (Actual Expenditures)
Year .75 percentile .8 percentile .85 percentile .9 percentile .95 percentile Max
81 324                    1,200                         2,472                                  5,260                             14,729             536,419               
82 200                    1,106                         2,158                                  4,546                             14,989             1,262,137            
83 0 534                            1,676                                  4,792                             16,382             1,280,965            
84 0 2                                1,247                                  4,526                             15,699             1,848,640            
86 0 0 719                                     4,434                             17,552             2,961,303            
87 0 100                            1,509                                  6,295                             21,467             4,336,087            
88 0 608                            3,300                                  10,581                           30,818             3,374,052            
89 120                    1,727                         4,591                                  11,197                           31,855             7,190,542            
91 1,500                 5,129                         12,440                                24,614                           60,719             9,924,862            
92 1,772                 6,203                         13,914                                29,171                           68,304             10,176,789          
93 2,004                 6,347                         13,981                                29,282                           65,997             9,299,129            
Panel 3: R&D Expenditure Percentiles (% of total R&D exp. incurred by plants in equal or lower percentiles)
Year .75 percentile .8 percentile .85 percentile .9 percentile .95 percentile Max
81 0.1% 1.1% 3.2% 7.5% 18.4% 100%
82 0.1% 0.6% 2.1% 5.3% 12.6% 100%
83 0 0.1% 0.9% 3.1% 9.7% 100%
84 0 0.0% 0.4% 2.0% 6.9% 100%
86 0 0 0.1% 1.2% 6.4% 100%
87 0 0.0% 0.3% 1.9% 7.4% 100%
88 0 0.1% 0.8% 3.2% 10.5% 100%
89 0.0% 0.3% 1.2% 3.7% 10.1% 100%
91 0.1% 0.8% 2.8% 7.0% 16.3% 100%
92 0.1% 1.0% 3.2% 7.6% 17.5% 100%
93 0.2% 0.9% 2.9% 6.9% 15.9% 100%
Notes: All expenditures are nominal thousands of TW$. Data unavaliable in 1985 and 1990. In Panels 2 and 3 all 70th percentile entries = 0  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: R&D in the Korean Semiconductor Industry 1993-96
Panel 1: Summary Statistics
Year No. Of Plants Industry Revenue No. of R&D Active Plants Proportion doing R&D Avg R&D Exp. Total R&D Exp.
93 203 6,682,204              41 20.2% 1,906                78,153              
94 229 9,646,433              42 18.3% 2,432                102,155            
95 238 17,661,540            44 18.5% 3,691                162,402            
96 261 17,044,308            40 15.3% 4,824                192,961            
Panel 2: R&D Expenditure Percentiles (Actual Expenditures)
Year .75 percentile .8 percentile .85 percentile .9 percentile .95 percentile Max
93 0 1.8 48.9 188.6 888.2 148,801            
94 0 0 28 123.2 310.8 177,022            
95 0 0 15 124.3 542 360,338            
96 0 0 1 150 907 559,258           
Notes: All expenditures are nominal Korean Won (in millions)
 
 
